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Iran's Natanz Facility  
by Marshall Breit, Research Assistant
Friday, May 02, 2003

The news that Iran is building a uranium enrichment facility has increased previously existing concerns over Iran's nuclear intentions. Information about the full extent of Iran's current and future capabilities is not known, but enough information has been publicly discussed to provide some background.

Natanz
The Natanz facility is located in central Iran, approximately 200 miles south of Tehran. The complex itself is extensive and covers nearly 100,000 square meters. Many of the largest structures within the complex are buried underground. The two largest of these structures enclose about 60,000 square meters collectively. 1

The full facility is still under construction and is not scheduled for completion until 2005. According to administration and IAEA officials, there are currently 160 centrifuge machines at the facility that are considered operational and parts are in place for another 1000 machines. Iran denies that any uranium has been run through these units, but experts believe Iran would be unlikely to move forward with serial production of centrifuges that had not been tested with uranium. A recent Time magazine article also reports that the IAEA found that Iran had added uranium to the centrifuges to test the machines.2 When completed, the Natanz facility is expected to house 5,000 gas centrifuges and could produce enough material for two weapons a year.3

There has been much speculation about Iran's decision to place the most sensitive sites underground. In a press briefing in December, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said, ""It appears from the imagery that a service road, several small structures, and perhaps three large structures are being built below grade, and some of these are already being covered with earth. Iran clearly intended to harden and bury that facility. That facility was probably never intended by Iran to be a declared component of the peaceful program. Instead, Iran has been caught constructing a secret underground site where it could produce fissile material."

Construction on the Natanz facility is believed to have begun in 2000.4 However, Iran's ambitions to develop an indigenous uranium enrichment program date back more than a decade. According to western intelligence sources, in the early '90s Iran repeatedly attempted to purchase balancing machines and diagnostic and monitoring equipment from various European countries.5

Where Did The Technology Come From?
It is still unclear exactly where Iran obtained the designs and materials to manufacture the centrifuges at the Natanz site. There is speculation amongst U.S. officials that the original design came from Pakistan and was adapted by the Iranians. According to a report in the Washington Post, Iran was able to overcome engineering obstacles with the assistance of foreign scientists. 6 Iranian officials have stated that their reluctance to disclose the existence of the facility was due in part to their concern that the U.S. would pressure foreign suppliers to stop aiding the project. This comment appears to confirm that outside assistance for the facility was used.

Violation of the NPT?

Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on July 1, 1968, and maintains it remains a member in good standing. Tehran, however, has not signed the IAEA's 93 + 2 protocol, which allows the agency to inspect all nuclear activities, including those that are undeclared by member states. Under the original safeguards agreement, Iran is not obligated to declare the Natanz enrichment plant until 180 days before the facility is supplied with nuclear material. If Iranian claims are true and no nuclear material has been run through machines at this facility, failure to immediately disclose the facility is not a violation of Iran's NPT commitments. During Mohamed ElBaradei's visit to Iran in February, Iranian officials agreed to provide design information on the Natanz facility to the IAEA this spring.7



Additional Resources:

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Notes:

1 "Detailed Assessment of the Possible Uranium Enrichment Plant at Natanz, Iran," ISIS Issue Brief by
David Albright, February 20, 2003
2 "Iran's Nuclear Threat," Time, March 13, 2003
3 "Iran's Nuclear Program Speeds Ahead," Washington Post, March 10, 2003
4 Natanz Fact Sheet by John Pike, Global Security.org
5 Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destrcution
6 "Iran's Nuclear Program Speeds Ahead," Washington Post, March 10, 2003
7 "Furor over Fuel," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003


More Analysis
Spring Thaw in South Asia
Even as snow continues to fall in the Himalayan passes of Kashmir, there is an unexpected spring thaw in relations between South Asia's nuclear rivals. On May 18, Indian soldiers released by Pakistan after two years of imprisonment returned to their families. The emotional scenes illustrated renewed hopes for the region as confidence-building steps continued in South Asia. New Delhi and Islamabad are exchanging ambassadors and resuming travel links. In his latest visit to the region, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said he was "cautiously optimistic" that Prime Minister Vajpayee's diplomatic opening "could possibly lead to a step-by-step process that would eventually resolve all issues."
SORT of a Treaty
The Russian Duma ratified the Strategic Offensive ReductionsTreaty (SORT) on May 14, which calls for both the U.S. and Russia to reduce their alert strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700-2,200 over the next ten years. The move follows the U.S. Senate's March approval of the pact and clears the way for the U.S. and Russian presidents to mark the entry into force of this agreement at their upcoming summit in St. Petersburg. While the adoption of the agreement is a political victory for both presidents, it is not clear that the treaty makes a major improvement in the security of either country or for the world as a whole.
Talks With North Korea
The announcement that the United States, North Korea and China will hold talks next week in Beijing over North Korea's nuclear program is a welcome development and an apparent victory for the Bush administration's decision to oppose direct, one-on-one talks with Pyongyang. It remains to be seen, however, if the positions of the United States and North Korea can be brought together to address the severe security concerns raised by Pyongyang's active nuclear weapons program.
      

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Tuesday, May 20, 2003

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Tuesday, May 20, 2003

Bush's New Nuclear Push (Time)
Monday, May 19, 2003

New Front Sets Sights On Toppling Iran Regime (Forward)
Friday, May 16, 2003

U.S. Warns U.N. Agency on Iran Nuclear Program (Reuters)
Friday, May 16, 2003

Powell and Putin Say Iraq Rift Is Mended, and Then Disagree (New York Times)
Thursday, May 15, 2003


  

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