After 25 years, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is up for debate. On these nine pages, two views of the conditions for its extension, and a look at a closely related issue.
By William Epstein
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) turns 25 in March, and its life expectancy after that is uncertain. The NPT Review and Extension Conference, mandated by Article X of the treaty, will be held at the United Nations in New York from April 17 to May 12.
The five declared nuclear powers- the United States, Russia, Britain France, and China-say that the treaty must be extended "indefinitely and unconditionally" at the conference. That doesn't seem likely to happen. Translated, the "unconditional and indefinite" phrase means "no linkages." In fact there are linkages, and they are rooted in the language of the treaty.
The treaty's preamble recalls the determination to end nuclear weapons testing as well as the desire to "facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery."
Further, Article VI of the treaty outlines a legally binding commitment: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
The majority of the non-nuclear parties to the NPT-referred to as "the non-aligned" or as the "Group of 77," now consisting of about 115 states-believe that the five declared nuclear powers, particularly the United States and Russia, have not lived up to their part of the bargain. Although the East-West nuclear arms race is history, the goal of nuclear disarmament has gotten short shrift. The non-nuclear states-led by nations such as Mexico, Indonesia, and Nigeria-aim to remedy that at the Extension Conference.
The first linkage will be an effort to lock the extension of the treaty to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTB). If a CTB is concluded before the Extension Conference, the NPT is likely to be extended for a significant period or periods. But if a test ban is not concluded by then, it is possible that the treaty will gain just a short extension, or that the Extension Conference itself will be recessed or extended-perhaps for a year or two-to give CTB negotiators more time to get the job done.
The second linkage is especially powerful. With the end of the Cold War, many of the non-nuclear members of the NPT see the abolition of nuclear weapons as a newly realistic goal. They will insist at the Extension Conference that the declared nuclear powers get on with the task of nuclear disarmament.
That is in keeping with the spirit of the treaty. When the NPT was negotiated in the 1960s, the declared nuclear powers wanted a treaty of indefinite duration. But many of the non-nuclear states insisted on review conferences every five years and an extension conference at the end of 25 years. That was to give the non-nuclear nations leverage in forcing the nuclear powers to pay attention to the preamble and Article VI.
In the absence of a binding legal commitment by the nuclear powers to eliminate their nuclear weapons by a fixed date, the non-aligned nations argue today-as they did in 1968- that an indefinite extension would simply legitimize the possession of these weapons by the nuclear powers indefinitely. That would be discriminatory and, some suggest, immoral.
Rather than an indefinite extension, many of the non-aligned nations favor a series of fixed periods of extension, each loaded with conditions. That is, the declared nuclear powers would be expected to achieve certain specific disarmament goals during each extension period.
On the slow track
Prospects for a CTB rose in July 1993, when U.S. President Bill Clinton extended a congressionally mandated moratorium on nuclear testing. France, Russia, and Britain also had moratoriums, although in the latter case, it was by default. Britain uses the Nevada Test Site for its tests.
In August 1993, the United States reversed years of opposition to a CTB and agreed with the other states in the Conference on Disarmament to begin CTB negotiations in January 1994.
Also in August 1993, the United States became part of a consensus decision to simultaneously pursue a comprehensive ban within the framework of the Test Ban Amendment Conference-which was organized expressly to transform the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty into a comprehensive test ban treaty.
Although the Conference on Disarmament and the Test Ban Amendment Conference operate on separate tracks, their efforts can be informally coordinated. The consensus decision said that negotiations within the Test Ban Amendment Conference and the Conference on Disarmament would be "mutually supportive and complementary."
Over the past year, the United States has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to achieving a CTB "as soon as possible," and it provided evidence of that commitment by supporting Miguel Marin Bosch of Mexico-a long-time CTB champion-as chairman of the Conference on Disarmament's Nuclear Test Ban Committee.
Despite the efforts of the United States and Russia, together with the non-nuclear states, it is unrealistic to think that such a complicated piece of work will be finished soon. In fact, Britain and France have been accused of dragging their feet in the Conference on Disarmament. Their enthusiasm for a CTB seems weak. Britain has even proposed a "reverse linkage," arguing that an indefinite extension of the NPT would help the CTB effort. Both nations have also said that a CTB should permit monitored nuclear tests for safety and reliability on a case-by-case basis.
China's role in the negotiations is ambiguous. Unlike the other four declared nuclear powers, it continues to test. Chinese officials say that they will end the testing program in 1996, and China would then join a CTB- within the context of its long-standing policy calling for the no-first-use of nuclear weapons and the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear arsenals.
The CTB is on the slow track. Progress has been modest and many other difficult issues remain, such as how to define a nuclear test and whether to permit hydronuclear tests, which produce tiny nuclear yields. Thorny questions regarding verification and compliance also abound.
Hardly anyone believes that a CTB can be concluded by the Conference on Disarmament before the NPT Extension Conference begins in April 1995. Marin Bosch said at the end of August that it would be a "minor miracle" if a CTB were concluded by April. Even a 1996 completion date strikes some as optimistic.
That hard reality may force the hand of the non-nuclear parties to the NPT, which have repeatedly said that if the CTB is not concluded, they might recess the Extension Conference or agree to only a two- or three-year extension period, pending the successful conclusion of the negotiations.
On September 1, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati of Iran became the first to speak openly in the Conference on Disarmament against concluding the NPT Extension Conference after one month. He said the New York meeting could be "extended for as long as necessary in order to insure that sufficient progress . . . has been made." Only then, he said, could delegates consider fixed periods of extension for the NPT.
Because the non-aligned parties to the NPT number about 115, they constitute a clear majority of the 165 parties to the treaty. In theory, they would be able to produce the simple majority required for any decision on a procedural matter or on the period of extension at the conference.
It is possible, of course, that the declared nuclear powers and the non-nuclear parties to the NPT are engaged in pre-conference posturing and jockeying for position. All parties to the NPT presumably would like to see the the treaty extended and strengthened, and it is possible that the different camps may yet agree on a compromise. But for now, it is difficult to imagine a successful outcome for the April conference without a CTB.
Fast-tracking the CTB
As noted, the Conference on Disarmament is not the only forum considering a CTB. The Test Ban Amendment Conference is working on a CTB, too. The United States, however, has thrown its weight behind the Conference on Disarmament effort rather than the work of the Amendment Conference. That may be a serious mistake. For the sake of the NPT, a two-track approach is needed.
To be sure, the Conference on Disarmament has more experience in negotiating treaties as well as in dealing with verification and compliance issues. In addition, it includes China and France, which are not parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty.
On the down side, each of the current 37 active members of the Conference on Disarmament has a veto on both procedural and substantive questions. That slows negotiations to a crawl or blocks them entirely.
In contrast, a simple first-step CTB could be arranged merely by adding a protocol banning all underground nuclear tests to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Because that treaty does not define a nuclear test, vexing questions of definition need not be considered. Thus, if the parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty so decide, the amendment could be adopted quickly.
Once ratified by a simple majority of the parties, including the three depository governments (the United States, Britain, and Russia), the revised Partial Test Ban Treaty-now comprehensive-would bind states not party to the NPT, including Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel and Ukraine.
Although this fast-track route would speed the process, it would not produce a definitive CTB. Many complex questions necessary to negotiating a permanent CTB would not have been answered. And China and France would not be parties.
Nevertheless, the Amendment Conference approach could give the world a CTB quickly enough to impress delegates to the NPT Extension Conference, thus insuring a significant extension of the NPT.
Meanwhile, the Conference on Disarmament would continue its work, eventually producing a CTB that would be definitive and universal, and which would map out effective verification and compliance language. Energy could then be focused on bringing China and France on board.
The NPT and a nuclear-weapon-free world
The NPT was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (the predecessor of the Conference on Disarmament). In August 1966, the non-aligned members of the committee submitted a Joint Memorandum on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calling for "tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery."
The non-aligned nations put forward five demands designed to establish a more balanced and less discriminatory regime. They were:
Negotiate a CTB.
Cease production of fissile material for weapons.
Freeze and then gradually reduce the number of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.
Ban the use of nuclear weapons.
Assure the security of non-nuclear- weapon states.
These demands have been a constant refrain of many of the non-nuclear countries at every five-year NPT Review Conference since the treaty entered into force in 1970. But because of deep Cold War divisions between East and West, no negotiations or even serious discussions were ever undertaken to get rid of nuclear weapons.
The 1995 Extension Conference, however, will be the first NPT conference to take place after the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West nuclear arms race. Many delegates to the conference from the non-nuclear nations believe that now is the best time since the 1940s to press hard for progress toward achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. Conditions-"linkages"-are in the air.
In May 1994, President Clinton, in a joint statement with Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao of India, expressed "strong support" for the progressive destruction of weapons of mass destruction (which includes nuclear weapons) "with the goal of the elimination of such weapons." Since the elimination of these weapons can be achieved only by a step-by-step process spread over a period of time, the best way of doing it would be by a series of fixed periods of extension.
Assuming that a CTB is concluded before the Extension Conference-an iffy assumption-the non-nuclear nations may push for a series of five-year extensions, each conditional on the achievement of specific measures of nuclear disarmament. During each five-year period, certain goals would have to be reached or the NPT itself would be in jeopardy. Before the expiration of each period, the 1995 Extension Conference would reconvene, or a new extension conference would be convened if the parties so decided, to review whether the conditions had been substantially achieved. Ideally, the linkages might look something like this:
1995-2000
A no-first-use agreement by the five declared nuclear powers.
Strengthened pledges by the nuclear powers to come to the aid of non-nuclear states threatened by nuclear weapons.
Taking all weapons off alert status; significantly separating all warheads and bombs from their delivery vehicles.
Cessation of the production of weapons-grade fissile material and of nuclear weapons.
Achievement of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and Southeast Asia.
Establishment of a verification and control system for the Biological Weapons Convention and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Full implementation of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms and of the U.N. Reports on Military Expenditures.
2000-2005
Reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles in Russia and the United States to 1,000 each.
Reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles of China, France, and Britain to 200 each.
Establish international controls and safeguards over the dismantling of nuclear weapons.
Devise international controls and safeguards over all enriched uranium and plutonium, military or civilian.
Conclude a treaty banning the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.
Negotiate nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia, which would respectively include Israel, India, and Pakistan.
Put in place regional structures for the limitation, reduction, and control of conventional arms and forces.
2005-2010
Reduce and dismantle all nuclear weapons of the five declared nuclear powers to 100 each.
Reduce ceilings for all countries for their conventional arms and forces.
2010-2020
Eliminate all nuclear weapons from national arsenals.
Transfer a few nuclear weapons to the U.N. Security Council as insurance against the clandestine retention or acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Reduce all conventional arms and armed forces to levels required for internal security, or for use of the United Nations in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.
Act now or pay later
In the year 2020, another NPT Extension Conference would be convened to decide the long-range future of the NPT. But for a successful outcome then, we need to act now.
During the successive fixed periods, the United Nations would have to be strengthened so it could more effectively engage in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcement. Beyond that, the United Nations must assume a greater role in promoting economic development and social justice. But that is beyond the scope of this essay.
I have been involved in an official capacity in disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, at the United Nations for nearly half a century. Despite the remarkable recent progress toward limited nuclear disarmament by the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union, I have become increasingly worried by the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, and the dismantling of thousands of American and Russian nuclear weapons have all contributed to the growing danger of theft or diversion of military fissile material. Unemployed or underpaid nuclear weapons scientists may also be attracted by tempting offers from potential proliferators. In addition, growing stocks of civilian plutonium are not subject to adequate international control.
Furthermore, the five declared nuclear powers still regard their nuclear weapons as important deterrents that enhance their security. China, France, and Britain are planning to improve and increase their nuclear arsenals. Meanwhile, Russia and the United States have no apparent plans to reduce their arsenals below 3,000 to 3,500 weapons each, as called for in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II. Nor have they abandoned plans to modernize or improve their weapons.
As long as the declared nuclear powers believe that nuclear weapons are necessary-for them, at least-it is likely that non-nuclear states with regional security concerns will someday opt for nuclear weapons.
Irrespective of the length of the extension decided on by the 1995 conference, unless the nuclear weapon states are prepared to commit themselves to the elimination of nuclear weapons-as required by the preamble and Article VI of the NPT-the NPT and the non-proliferation regime will be imperiled over the long run.
The only sure way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to undertake a program that will lead to their eventual elimination. The Extension Conference provides a rare opportunity for the parties to the NPT to move decisively in that direction.
By John D. Holum
You may have heard the apocryphal story of the young man who climbs a distant mountain to seek advice from the revered old wise man who renounced vast riches and celebrity. When he asks the wise man what he should do he is told only, "My son, avoid hedonism, do not seek fame-such things are a snare and a delusion."
The younger man looks at the wise man and says: "Thank you sage one. Could I just try them for a month first?"
One of the problems with nuclear weapons, of course, is that you can't just try them for a month.
It is human nature to try things out, keep options open, explore new possibilities. That's often not a bad thing. But the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is too essential to put at risk.
Nevertheless, as next April's NPT Conference approaches, we hear many voices demanding that we tinker with the treaty. While some of them may be sincere, experimentation would be folly.
The NPT's entry into force in 1970 transformed the acquisition of nuclear weapons from an act of national pride into a violation of international law. If it crumbles-indeed, if cracks are detected-a great deal of the nuclear security architecture painstakingly constructed by the international community may collapse.
The NPT serves two mutually reinforcing aims: nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. It does this by balancing positive and negative rights and obligations. It is at once an agreement to forgo nuclear weapons; an agreement to put peaceful nuclear facilities under international safeguards; an undertaking to end the arms race and pursue nuclear disarmament; and an agreement promoting access to technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Winning the NPT's indefinite and unconditional extension is my agency's highest priority in coming months. Let me summarize why the United States holds the treaty so dear.
A vital global norm
During the 1960s, many predicted that, if nothing were done, there would be 20 or 30 avowed nuclear-weapons states by now. But in fact, there are only five-the same as when the NPT was brought into force-and three other "threshold" states.
The NPT system has steadily expanded since 1970, and there has been considerable tangible progress in recent years. China has joined, as have France, South Africa, and most of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Argentina and Algeria have announced their intention to join. And Chile and Brazil have announced that they will not acquire nuclear weapons.
With 165 parties (and counting), the NPT enjoys the widest adherence of any arms control agreement in history. It has codified an international standard of behavior-a global norm-against which the actions of even states outside the regime are measured.
When the Argentines communicated their decision to join the NPT, the words they used revealed this powerful legal and moral norm at work. They said that they had long kept their nuclear option open out of a desire to add to their security. But they found that keeping the nuclear option open had the opposite effect of excluding them from the political and economic circles where, they finally realized, their true security lies. They told us-with evident emotion-that they wanted to join the NPT in order "to join the civilized world."
Reflexive egalitarianism
Some complain that the NPT is "discriminatory" because it accepts five nuclear powers and freezes out all others. But remember that the treaty did not create nuclear-weapon "haves" and "have-nots." It only recognized that inherited reality-and helped stop a deadly trend in its tracks- while at the same time committing the nuclear-weapon states to pursue nuclear disarmament.
Remember this: The measure of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements lies not in their egalitarianism, but in their contributions to international security.
The fact is, if the world were to insist today on a reflexive nuclear equality, the likely result would be a leveling up, not a leveling down. Not a world freed of nuclear weapons, but a world filled with nuclear-weapon states.
Another argument one hears is that indefinite extension would legitimize nuclear weapons for all time. In fact, the opposite is true.
In recent years, with the NPT in place-we and the former Soviet Union have:
n eliminated more than 2,500 missiles and taken an entire class of weapon systems out of commission under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
n decided unilaterally to withdraw and dismantle thousands more tactical nuclear arms.
n agreed in START and START II to reverse the strategic arms race and take more than 17,000 nuclear weapons off missiles and bombers.
Taken together, these actions have resulted in nuclear disarmament on a massive scale. The NPT's call for an end to the arms race has been met. The race is now to bring down force levels as quickly, safely, and securely as possible. Thousands of nuclear weapons are being dismantled. The United States alone is dismantling around 2,000 nuclear weapons a year, the highest rate that technical limitations will permit.
Test ban treaty in sight
The ledger in fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT includes two additional entries: Multilateral efforts to negotiate a worldwide fissile material cutoff treaty, and the drive to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty.
A cutoff treaty would cap the amount of material available for nuclear explosives. It could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programs of certain non-NPT states-India, Pakistan, and Israel-under some measure of restraint for the first time. And it would prevent any further production of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons in the five declared nuclear-weapon states.
Achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty is also an imperative for the United States-a fact underscored earlier this year when I delivered a personal message from President Clinton to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The president's message said that of all the items on the conference's agenda, "none is more important" than negotiating the treaty "at the earliest possible time." We want to insure that the first half-century of nuclear explosions is the last.
A foolish gamble
The NPT is an important stimulus to disarmament. Pressure to disarm will be kept on the nuclear weapons states by reaffirming Article VI of the treaty and keeping the treaty in force indefinitely. Anything less will have the perverse result of easing the pressure to disarm.
The NPT also fosters the global conditions that permit deep reductions in nuclear arms. It is a simple, practical reality that arms control will suffer if the barriers against nuclear proliferation are lowered. Indeed, it is clear that-perhaps unlike the Cold War period-future progress in arms control depends on the security offered by a permanent NPT.
Well, it is then argued, why not hold up the NPT-or just extend it for a short time-as a way to force even greater progress on the nuclear- weapon states? Some, for example, suggest that we should hold an NPT extension hostage to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, then make it permanent.
There are many flaws to such arguments, but two main ones. First, treating the NPT as a bargaining chip is dangerously self-defeating. And second, it jeopardizes what in practical terms is our one realistic opportunity to make the NPT last forever.
Those who think the NPT is a bargaining chip ignore a cardinal rule: don't gamble with something you can't afford to lose.
For reasons that include geography, the countries most immediately put at risk by nuclear proliferators are their immediate and regional neighbors-not the United States. We support the NPT in our own interests, to be sure. But it is even more strongly in the interests of countries located in regions of tension.
The NPT gives all member countries the security of knowing that their neighbors and regional rivals will not be able to effectively pursue nuclear-weapons ambitions-not only because they have agreed not to, but also because there is a global system to verify that they haven't.
So for all those whose votes will decide its fate, the NPT is a source not of leverage but of security. The NPT's greatest value to the international community is not as a lever for moving the nuclear states, but as a shield to ward off regional arms races and nuclear dangers.
Many countries have testified to this truth with their deeds. In Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Africa, nations have adopted or are moving toward nuclear-weapon-free zones that do not contain analogues to the NPT's Article VI. This confirms that it is not principally Article VI that draws countries to a commitment against acquiring nuclear weapons, but rather a recognition that their own security is enhanced when they codify the norm of nuclear nonproliferation in their own backyards.
A corollary of the bargaining-chip argument, the notion that indefinite extension can be put off, is particularly dangerous because it is so seductively plausible-and so wrong.
Article X of the treaty explicitly spells out the three and only three extension options the parties have in 1995: Indefinite extension, extension for a fixed period, or extension for fixed periods. What is not made explicit in the treaty-but is so important to its fate-is that 1995 represents the only realistic opportunity the parties have to give the NPT an indefinite extension that is legally binding on every member without the need to go back to parliaments for ratification.
Extending the treaty for a fixed term won't work. Because the treaty currently contains no provision for a further extension after the first, it would have to be amended to provide for such a decision, or else expire. Treaty amendment, in turn, would require not only the votes of a specialized majority of the parties-including all members of the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and all five nuclear weapons states-but also ratification by 83 national legislatures (at present count).
It is not realistic to count on achieving amendment. Simply collecting the ratifications of most parties could take years-after all, it took 19 years for the 98 original NPT signatories to ratify the treaty. And even if the amendment were brought into force, it would only apply to those states that actually ratify it, giving many states an easy way to back out of the treaty.
The treaty also can be extended for fixed periods. The length of each period, number of periods, and the type of transition mechanism that would be needed to go from one period to the next would have to be resolved. By requiring (and deferring) such difficult decisions-many of which have uncertain legality-this option also clearly risks the possibility of eventual treaty expiration. Again, indefinite extension is the only way to insure that the NPT will endure.
Pressure to join the club
Another frequent criticism of the NPT is that certain countries have not joined. Some states, for example, have said that support for indefinite extension would be difficult without Israel's adherence to the NPT.
But enlarging the prospect that the NPT may lapse at some point makes it less likely-not more likely-that states like Israel, India, and Pakistan ultimately will join. The best chance for their ultimate adherence lies in a strong treaty that is a permanent part of the international security system.
The same principle holds in every region. It is the NPT that provides the essential worldwide framework for addressing diverse proliferation problems and promoting stability.
Had there been no NPT, an agreement very much like it probably would have had to be invented to address the proliferation dangers inherent in the breakup of a nuclear superpower into a dozen newly independent states. The commitment of most of these states to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon state parties has done much to ease tensions and reduce risks during this challenging formative period.
In Africa, South Africa's adherence to the NPT helped to open a security dialogue with other African states and pave the way for negotiation of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty. Here, as in Latin America with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NPT and regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties complement and reinforce one another.
In the Middle East, the NPT is the only norm in force against nuclear proliferation. If it should expire after some limited extension, there would be no formal constraints on Iraqi, Iranian, and Libyan nuclear weapons programs, for example, and no basis for acting against these or any other states whose nonproliferation bona fides might be open to question.
Related to the universality argument is the argument that the NPT does not deserve indefinite extension because it has not solved every nuclear proliferation problem, such as North Korea and Iraq. But this betrays a misunderstanding of where arms control and nonproliferation regimes leave off, and where the need for political will in the international community begins.
The IAEA has risen to the challenge revealed by the case of Iraq by strengthening its system of safeguards-reaffirming the right to special inspections at undeclared sites, and approving a voluntary program of reporting nuclear exports. And field trials are also under way to test other strengthening measures.
In North Korea, the IAEA's inspections have demonstrated its dogged vigilance in the pursuit of international safeguards agreements. In verifying North Korea's initial declaration, the agency found discrepancies that led it to seek special inspections at undeclared sites.
While the case of North Korea is yet to be resolved, the fact that the NPT's enforcement requires political will in the international community is hardly an indictment of the treaty. To the contrary, the U.N.'s engagement demonstrates that the NPT system works-for it is only the U.N. Security Council that can act on behalf of the international community to enforce its norms.
Life without the NPT
If the NPT reflects so much wisdom, why not follow its own initial pattern and extend it for a 25-year term? The answer: Because any doubts that led to that compromise have been resolved.
The NPT was untested then; now we know the global nonproliferation regime works. Then the future was unclear; now we have experienced the treaty's effective operation over time and through changing conditions. Countries' responses to it could not be predicted then; now we know it has the broadest adherence of any international arms control agreement. So our best guide now is not the uncertainty of 1968, but the informed confidence of 1995
Arms control regimes typically are permanent-including the ABM, START, and INF treaties, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and even the regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. Surely the most successful, broadest, and now increasingly vital global arms control regime deserves equal status.
I believe it is established that anything less than an indefinite extension will jeopardize the NPT's future. So the question becomes, why would that be a bad outcome?
No one can predict definitively the nature of the world without the NPT. But each of us must think concretely about the massive proliferation pressures that could be tragically unloosed if the treaty ever expires.
Among the nuclear-weapon states, the obligation for good faith negotiations toward disarmament would be gone-and pressures to maintain and build large arsenals and develop new weapons would reappear.
In the former Soviet Union, the basis for averting several newly independent nuclear-weapon states would be undermined.
As to the threshold states, any political leverage for universal adherence to nonproliferation norms would be gravely weakened, not strengthened.
In Northeast Asia, would the spotlight of world attention shine as white-hot as it does now on North Korea without the NPT? Consider what the other nations in that region might feel compelled to do without the bulwark-the constant gravitational pull and pressure-exerted by the NPT. And then consider the cascading effect their actions would likely have on still other countries.
Consider the countries that are almost entirely ignored in NPT discussions-all the countries for whom nuclear arms are not an issue, because they have made and kept nuclear nonproliferation commitments.
The NPT's greatest achievements are invisible-consisting of bad things not happening, nuclear material not diverted, weapons not made. We cannot know which additional countries might have decided, but for the NPT, that they needed nuclear arms. We do know that more than 40 countries may well have the required technical and economic resources to produce such weapons.
Without the NPT, we have to assume that over time many of those bad things would begin to happen. We would be very hard pressed to keep states from hedging their nuclear bets against an uncertain future.
The Japanese have a saying: "The nail that stands out will be hammered down." Today, proliferant countries know how that feels, because they are exposed to the global hammer against nuclear weapons-the NPT.
But in a world without the treaty, the nails sticking out-especially in regions of tension-could become those states not pursuing or possessing nuclear arms. Countries might avoid standing out in such a world not by resisting pressures to have nuclear weapons, but by succumbing to them.
With the end of the Cold War, nuclear proliferation pressures may be more substantial than ever. So this is at once the best time to buttress international security-and the most essential.
Our challenge is to recognize the singular nature of this decision and seize the moment. We need to elevate NPT extension to a higher plane- above the din of politics as usual at the United Nations, above the ordinary international jockeying and horse-trading. History will not treat us kindly if we act irresponsibly. But far harder to bear would be our own realization that we miscalculated with our children's security.
We must realize instead that in April 1995, we will be taking, together, the most fateful single vote for world peace of the remainder of this century and for years to come.
If our seriousness of purpose reflects the true stakes, I know we will do the right thing-and enshrine this indispensable agreement for all nations, for all people, for all time.
By Eric Arnett and Annette Schaper
Just how "comprehensive" should the comprehensive test ban treaty be? Among the many controversial issues negotiators are wrestling with at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is the question: Should the test ban prohibit hydronuclear experiments?
Hydronuclear experiments release very small amounts of fission energy (usually less than the equivalent of 1 kilogram of TNT). If an effort is made to ban these low-yield experiments in the treaty, it could derail the negotiations. And if the text of the treaty is not completed or well on its way by April, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference could also be in trouble.
Some Defense Department officials have been pressing President Clinton to authorize the weapons laboratories to conduct hydronuclear experiments. But other Defense officials, as well as many officials at State, Energy, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, say that conducting hydronuclear experiments would simply add an unnecessary obstacle to their efforts to complete the comprehensive test ban treaty and secure an indefinite extension of the NPT. In addition, they say, hydronuclear experiments are illegal.
Some U.S. and European anti-nuclear groups want to use the Conference on Disarmament negotiations as another tool in their battle against the U.S. hydronuclear program. These groups have been trying to rally the non-nuclear weapon states to their cause. Their goal-blocking a wasteful and provocative program-is admirable, but the treaty text is not the right place to wage the struggle.
If the effort to gain support for a ban on hydronuclear experiments is successful, negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament will become hopelessly deadlocked. Not only are the nuclear-weapon states opposed to a ban, states on the nuclear threshold and states of proliferation concern will not accept it either.
Until recently, the conference was handling the issue informally, with quiet discussions involving those on both sides of the debate. But in June the hydronuclear issue was brought into the open. Just before the Conference on Disarmament recessed, Iran declared in a plenary session that it favored a ban on hydronuclear experiments. Iran's decision to make a public statement marked a hardening of its position.
Because the conference requires consensus among all its members on any decision, disagreement on the hydronuclear issue could make it impossible to complete the text of the treaty before the NPT Extension Conference by next spring-if ever.
In a hydronuclear experiment, some of the fissile material in a nuclear explosive device is replaced by material that will not fission. When the high explosive in the device is detonated, it compresses the fissile material to a density that is barely critical, and only a small amount of fission energy is released. Hydronuclear experiments are most useful for making simple, Nagasaki-type weapons lighter and smaller, so they should be of greatest interest to a country in the early stages of building a nuclear arsenal.
But hydronuclear experiments are not necessary-not to the development of a first-generation bomb, and not to the development of the second-generation weapons currently deployed by the nuclear powers. Nor would they be of much use in developing the third-generation weapons that may be on the horizon in the absence of a comprehensive test ban.
The results of hydronuclear experiments contribute little to the reliability and safety or the modernization of advanced designs. Most of the same information can be obtained from "hydrodynamic experiments," in which all of the fissile material in a device is replaced.
One reason why anti-nuclear groups want to ban hydronuclear experiments is their concern that such experiments would aid the development of very low-yield nuclear weapons-so-called mini-nukes. But hydronuclear experiments would not contribute substantially to the design of mini-nukes either.
A more compelling reason why the nuclear states want to exempt hydronuclear experiments is their use in maintaining testing expertise-and therefore, the capacity to resume full-scale testing quickly.
In any case, anti-nuclear groups believe that French, Russian, British, and U.S. efforts to exempt hydronuclear experiments from the comprehensive test ban is hypocritical at best and suspicious at worst. They say the test ban will not be truly comprehensive if parties to the treaty are permitted to conduct what are essentially nuclear weapon tests, even if they are below an extremely low threshold.
Because non-nuclear members of the NPT have forsworn both hydronuclear and hydrodynamic experiments, they are sympathetic to the idea of eliminating hydronuclear experiments simply on the basis of fairness. This position has much to commend it, and the test ban regime would be stronger if the United States and other nuclear powers would each agree unilaterally not to conduct low-yield tests.
But progress on the test ban should not be interrupted to incorporate a ban on hydronuclear experiments, which would generate endless debate on complex verification techniques. Any serious attempt to establish a verification regime aggressive enough to detect hydronuclear experiments would meet with serious opposition from the threshold states. The only alternative would be to create a hydronuclear ban with no provisions for its verification.
This is not to say that a hydronuclear ban could not be verified. But even the most effective verification regime would only detect hydronuclear experiments after the fact, through challenge inspections. Getting states to accept inspections of any test facility that could house hydronuclear experiments would be difficult.
The United States intends to build at least one facility where hydrodynamic experiments could be conducted as part of its "stockpile stewardship" program. If the United States were forced to prove that it had not conducted a hydronuclear experiment at that facility, it might-with considerable reluctance-allow inspectors to take measurements to show that no fissile material had been deposited in the explosion chamber. With no other way to distinguish hydronuclear from hydrodynamic experiments, these inspections might be frequent.
To make matters worse, many countries have facilities where similar explosions could be carried out, some of which are used to design conventional weapons. Inspections of these facilities are more likely to compromise proprietary and national security secrets than to detect non-compliance with a hydronuclear ban. In addition, hydronuclear experiments could be conducted in hidden facilities in states that are more secretive about their military installations.
India, Israel and Pakistan are long-time supporters of the comprehensive test ban, and they are eager for good publicity to replace the bad publicity they have received for refusing to sign the NPT. But Israel has already conducted hydronuclear experiments, and India and Pakistan, which have secretive arms industries, may have conducted hydrodynamic experiments.
None of the three, however, has plans to conduct nuclear tests, and they have no reason to fear inspection of their nuclear facilities. And any inspections that might be triggered by seismic false alarms are likely to be far from their nuclear installations. But if they were vulnerable to the inspection of a wide range of sensitive facilities every time they were accused of conducting a hydronuclear experiment, their carefully constructed postures of nuclear ambiguity would be compromised.
The case of Israel is particularly complicated. Its posture of nuclear ambiguity is the most elaborate and fragile of the three threshold states. If Israel refused to join a comprehensive test ban, it could touch off a chain reaction, with many other states making the same decision.
If the post-testing era began with India, Israel, Pakistan-joined by Iraq, Libya, Syria, and perhaps Algeria and Egypt-refusing to sign, the test ban treaty would have fallen far short of its goals.
Which brings us back to Iran. Iran is less concerned about inspections than some other states, having already invited the International Atomic Energy Agency to undertake any-time any-place inspections in an effort to disprove U.S. claims that it is attempting to develop nuclear weapons. In turn, Tehran would no doubt relish the opportunity to request inspections of Israeli nuclear facilities under the authority of the test ban treaty.
Iran's position-that hydronuclear experiments must be banned and Israel must sign and ratify the test ban treaty before it enters into force-is understandable. Even if its demand holds up completion of the treaty, Iran has little to lose. A test ban is not as important to Iran as is regional denuclearization, transparency in armaments (especially U.S. arms in the Gulf), and security guarantees. The issue of hydronuclear experiments makes a useful bargaining chip.
Nevertheless, a test ban that includes hydronuclear experiments- no matter how desirable-is simply not in the cards. With the exception of China, all the nuclear weapon states unambiguously oppose a hydronuclear ban, and they will make certain that the treaty and its negotiating history clearly preserve their right to conduct hydronuclear experiments-either to maintain testing expertise or to avoid intrusive verification. China, which is of two minds on the issue but leery of inspections, will probably join with the other weapon states.
The only remaining question, then, is whether other non-nuclear weapon states will join Iran and balk at creating an arguably less-than-comprehensive test ban. If so, their opposition will look hypocritical to delegates to the NPT Extension Conference. Initial signs indicate that-Iran aside- the leading figures among the non-nuclear weapon states would rather have a comprehensive test ban that allows hydronuclear experiments than no ban at all. And that appears to be the choice.
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